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Undertaking foreign direct investment (FDI) is the defining feature of multinational enterprises
(MNEs). While emerging economies as recipients of FDI are familiar with MNEs, these MNEs tend
to be firms from the developed
world. A new breed of home-grown MNEs has now arisen from the
emerging economies, in particular
the group known as BRIC (Brazil,
Russia, India, and China). In this
article, the term “emerging multinationals” is employed to refer
to this new group of BRIC-based
MNEs. The type of FDI made
overseas by this group of emerging multinationals, is defined by
a more accurate term, outward
foreign direct investment (OFDI),
that is now used to differentiate
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it from the traditional FDI found
in emerging economies, which is
technically inward FDI (IFDI).
Overall, the OFDI made by the
emerging multinationals that form
BRIC is responsible for almost half
of all the OFDI from emerging
economies. This new OFDI made
by emerging multinationals has
led to sensational headlines. How
are these emerging multinationals
different from their counterparts in
developed economies? How can
we make sense of them? How can
experts in management provide a
better understanding of the emerging multinationals?
Compared to the multinationals from developed economies,
emerging multinationals are unique
with regard to their relationship
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with their national governments,
their degree of political involvement, and the relative importance
of their home markets. In addition,
these emerging multinationals, in
particular those from BRIC countries, may possess country-specific
and firm-specific advantages in terms of natural resources, economies
of scale, labor, and the cost of capital. The emergence of these new
emerging multinationals is widely
hailed as embodying the strengths
of the home economies that give
rise to them. This is true to a certain
extent – it is impossible to generate surplus capital to fund overseas
expansion if these firms are unable to achieve strong sales in their
home economies and if their home
economies have not grown in the
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first place. The media has tended
to treat this question in a sensational way, and it has attracted an
increasing amount of documented
academic research. This situation
is consistent with the traditional
MNE theory which addresses the
strengths of the MNEs and their
home economies.
However, what has not been
covered by either the media or
traditional theory is an opposing
view of considerable importance
that has been overlooked. This
view suggests that a lot of the
OFDI made by the emerging multinationals reflects the existence of
a number of institutional weaknesses that can be found in their
home economies in a macro context and possibly in the product,
labor, and/or capital markets as
well. These emerging multinationals are accustomed to operating
in an environment that may lack
an appropriate financial structure
or mechanisms to protect investors in their home countries. This
kind of national environment may
also be characterized by less than
optimal levels of transparency in
their regulatory systems and business environments. We argue that
a solid, balanced, and insightful
understanding of this new phenomenon – OFDI made by emerging
multinationals – cannot be attained without an equally determined
attempt to probe the institution-based determinants that lie behind
the emerging multinationals. This
essay seeks to offset the almost
one-sided coverage of the “strengths” side of this phenomenon by
dealing with the “weaknesses”.
Our aim is to leverage the recent
emergence of OFDI to extend and
enhance the institution-based view
of international business strategy
(Peng et al, 2008, 2009).
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ANOMALIES IN THE
PATTERN OF OFDI
MADE BY EMERGING
MULTINATIONALS
Let us start with two leading questions:
•

•

Which emerging economy of
the BRIC group has generated
the largest amount of OFDI
stock?
Which economy has received
the largest amount of OFDI
from multinationals in the
following emerging countries:
Brazil, Russia, India and China?

Based on the experience of
our lectures and interviews with
undergraduate, MBA, and executive education students around the
world, when answering the first
question, most people would cite
China, followed by Brazil or India.
Almost everybody in the room was
shocked when we told them that
of the BRIC countries, Russia has
generated the largest amount of
OFDI stock (Kuznetsov, 2011).
While the Western media is full of
accounts of China’s OFDI, such as
in Brazil (see Brasil Econômico’s
interview with the first co-author of
this article in 2010), Russia’s OFDI
stock (2.1% of the world total) is
much larger than China’s (1.5% of
the world total) (UNCTAD, 2011).
Yet, since 1991, no Western media
outlet has bothered to report on any
“Russia threat”. Instead, the media
is full of articles about a perceived
“China threat” in terms of economic competition. Russia’s economy
(which has the 11th largest GDP) is
much smaller (about four times) than
China’s (with the 2nd largest GDP).
If OFDI is a reflection of the streng-
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ths of the home economy, how can
firms from a much smaller and presumably weaker emerging economy
generate so much more OFDI?
Moreover, the main recipient of
Russia’s OFDI is tiny Cyprus. Brazil’s
multinationals invest heavily in the
British Virgin Islands (BVI), while
India’s OFDI has flooded Mauritius.
A full two-thirds of China’s OFDI
has gone to Hong Kong, and the
second largest recipient of China’s
OFDI is the BVI. How can these
relatively small economies, which
are well-known as tax havens, absorb so much OFDI from BRIC? A
close analysis of the available data
shows that they do not. In fact, a
high percentage of this OFDI is
re-invested back to BRIC – this is
known as capital round-tripping
(Fung et al, 2011). The principal
foreign investors (of stock) in Brazil, Russia, India, and China are the
BVI, Cyprus, Mauritius, and Hong
Kong, respectively. In China, the
BVI has the second largest FDI stock. In other words, the “real” OFDI
that is used to acquire local outfits,
build factories, and compete with
local rivals is much smaller than the
total OFDI dollar figures suggest.
Why should managers and firms
in BRIC undergo such an arduous
process of capital round-tripping?
We argue that the institutional weaknesses in the home economies
are outweighed by the potential
benefits associated with this kind
of capital round-tripping.

INSTITUTION-BASED
WEAKNESSES
If it is taken into account that a considerable amount of the OFDI from
BRIC is fueled by institution-based
weaknesses in these emerging eco-
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nomies, it follows that their domestic institutions for protecting private
property and facilitating investment
must be weak. For instance, in Brazil, bureaucratic regulations and heavy taxation on domestic earnings
have created incentives for firms to
invest overseas. As of 2008, two-thirds of Brazil’s OFDI stock went
to tax havens such as the BVI and
Cayman Islands. Another related
question is: Which economy in the
Latin America and the Caribbean region has generated the largest OFDI
stock? Almost everybody in our audience assumed it was Brazil, but
it is not. It is the BVI – year in and
year out. In 2010 (the most recent
year for which data from the World
Investment Report 2011 are available), the BVI generated about twice
the amount of OFDI flow as Brazil ($21 billion versus $11 billion).
In the year before (2009), the BVI
generated $28 billion OFDI flow,
while Brazil actually suffered from
a large negative OFDI flow of $10
billion (that is: Brazil received more
IFDI than its OFDI abroad and the
difference was $10 billion). What
happened in 2009 was very significant: Brazil’s negative OFDI flow
and the BVI’s strong OFDI flow
were due to intra-company loans
from Brazilian MNEs’ (primarily
BVI-based) affiliates and subsidiaries to their parent companies at
home, in an effort to combat the
global recession that had a negative
impact on Brazil.
As well as being concerned
about the factors outlined above, in
Russia, India, and China, managers
and firms are concerned about political instability, which may result
in the expropriation of their assets.
Given the political uncertainty in
Russia, this fear is likely to remain a
strong economic factor. This at least
partially explains the much higher
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proportion of Russia’s OFDI relative to GDP, noted earlier. In India,
the License Raj was intimidating.
The founders of Mittal Steel (now
part of ArcelorMittal) were born in
India, but draconian Indian regulations drove them abroad where
they registered their firm in the
Netherlands via OFDI. Then they
invested money back to India and
other countries. Likewise, Chinese
regulations are friendlier to foreign
investors than to domestic firms,
especially domestic private firms.
The Chinese government’s rationale
is to offer preferential treatment to
lure foreign firms, and it has largely
succeeded in this regard. However,
the drawback of this policy is that
it has driven many Chinese firms to
invest overseas. Overall, in response to the hostile climate created by
institutions in their home country,
a large number of managers and
firms in Russia, India, and China
have made a rational decision to
turn their operations at home into
“subsidiaries” of foreign firms which
are registered in places like Cyprus,
Mauritius, and Hong Kong (and
the BVI). In other words, when
one probes more deeply into the
institution-based reasoning behind
decisions regarding OFDI from
emerging economies, a lot of weaknesses in these economies are
revealed.

AN INSTITUTION-BASED
RESEARCH AGENDA
Academic specialists have argued
that institutional frameworks are
made up of formal and informal
constraints that interact with organizations. These institutional frameworks help firms by reducing
uncertainty. Traditional research
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into MNEs, which is almost exclusively based on the experience of
MNEs from developed economies,
has been conducted through a
“strengths” perspective. As noted
earlier, this “strengths” perspective can explain some of the OFDI
made by emerging multinationals.
However, it is clear that traditional
theory cannot fully explain, nor
help us predict, the strategy, behavior, and performance of emerging
multinationals. Employing, broadening, and deepening our understanding of the “weaknesses” perspective is essential to supplement
the “strengths” perspective.
We argue that what in theoretical terms can significantly
help advance the “weaknesses”
perspective is an institution-based
view, which lays stress on the dynamic interaction between institutions and organizations, and takes
full account of strategic choices as
being the logical outcome of these interactions (Peng et al, 2008,
2009). The rationale is that strategic
choices, such as undertaking OFDI,
is not merely driven by industrial
conditions and firm-specific resources, but are also a reflection
of the formal and informal constraints of a particular institutional
framework that managers confront.
While the proposition that “institutions matter” is hardly novel or
controversial, we have yet to unlock the institutional “black box”
that lies behind the rise of OFDI
from emerging multinationals.
Existing theories about MNE either
ignore capital round-tripping or
experience difficulty in explaining
it. A thorough search of material
in the leading journal in the field,
Journal of International Business
Studies (JIBS), since it was founded
in 1970, discovered that when we
used key phrases such as “round
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tripping,” “institutional arbitrage,”
and “regulatory arbitrage” in articles titles or abstracts, there was
only a single article by Fung et al.
(2011). While this article is a useful
start, clearly more research needs
to be conducted on these crucially
important but surprisingly underexplored topics.
From an institution-based standpoint, MNEs that undertake capital round-tripping tend to engage
in institutional or regulatory arbitrage (Fung et al, 2011). If we endeavor to leverage the OFDI from
emerging multinationals to build
new theories and enhance our understanding of this new phenomenon in global competition, further
institution-based research on the
institutional weaknesses inherent
in emerging economies that drive
OFDI is required.
This institution-based research
agenda is not only of significance
for MNEs from emerging economies, but also potentially important for MNEs from developed
economies as well. The following
is a case in point: tax havens became tax havens before the more
recent emergence of multinationals
from BRIC. While Brazilian and
Chinese MNEs are attracted to the
BVI (their first and second OFDI
destination, respectively), so do
many US MNEs. The loopholes
in US tax laws have led to many
special-purpose entities in the BVI
set up by American multinationals.
As the Obama administration has
become more desperate in its attempts to extract taxes from US-based firms, the BVI can expect
more FDI dollars from the United
States. We can speculate that for
the same reason that the small
islands of the BVI, with a total population of 30,000, cannot absorb
that much FDI from BRIC, it also
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cannot absorb a large amount from
the United States. In view of this,
it can be assumed that much of
the US OFDI to places such as the
BVI will be going back home too.
Hence, when examining the institution-based logic behind OFDI,
there are signs of convergence of
both the emerging and developed
economies.
Given this convergence, what,
then, are the differences between MNEs from the emerging and
developed economies that make
use of tax havens? The answer depends on the question of degree.
Despite the existence of numerous
US special-purpose entities in the
BVI and the Cayman Islands, presumably for tax haven purposes,
these countries do not appear on
either the list of the top five recipient countries of the US OFDI or
on the list of the top five countries
making IFDI in the United States. These countries are routinely
among the top five for both OFDI
from Brazil and China and IFDI in
Brazil and China.
In view of this, it is reasonable
to ask whether this OFDI to tax
havens for capital round-tripping
purposes will decrease as emerging
economies develop more business-friendly institutions. This may be
the case, but it is evident that as
the US loses its competitiveness
in offering business-friendly institutions (in other words, if the tax
burdens become too high for US
firms), the BVI and the Cayman
Islands may one day appear on
the list of the top five recipient
countries of US OFDI or on the list
of the top five countries making
IFDI in the United States. In short,
the institution-based weaknesses
of the US economy may also drive some of its firms to undertake
similar OFDI.
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POLICY AND MANAGERIAL
IMPLICATIONS
For policymakers in emerging economies, the implications of what
has been discussed above are twofold. First, they must strengthen
their positive role in support of
OFDI. For example, the Brazilian
Development Bank – Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social, BNDES – has acted as an intermediary for a lot of
OFDI that has been undertaken by
emerging multinationals from Brazil. Second, policymakers in emerging economies must take steps
to reduce the negative aspects of
their role. Unequal treatment between domestic and foreign firms
has driven some Chinese firms
abroad. Thus, if this unequal treatment (technically abolished as
of 2008) can be rectified, it may
reduce some capital round-tripping. In Russia, a greater respect
for the law would remove a large
number of uncertainties on the
part of many Russian firms and
managers, who might decide to
invest in Russia instead of making
the arduous capital round-trip. In
India, reducing the discretion of
the License Raj would go a long
way to making badly needed investment available for industry
at home.
Policymakers in host countries
should embrace a pragmatic form
of nationalism as opposed to being
excessively alarmed. While Brazil’s
and India’s OFDI does not lead to
a lot of political resistance abroad, Russia’s OFDI is an especially
sensitive issue in the former Soviet
bloc countries such as Hungary,
Poland, and Latvia (itself part of
the Soviet Union between 1941
and 1991). The return of the Rus-
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sian “bear” is a constant national
nightmare for some of these countries. China’s OFDI often provokes
the fear in the West that China is
“buying up the world”. Pragmatic
nationalism involves considering
both the pros and cons of FDI and
approving FDI only when its benefits outweigh its costs. It should be
remembered that the media “hoopla” tends to focus on the strengths of the economies that generate
this kind of OFDI. However, as
noted earlier, a lot of this OFDI is
a reflection of the weaknesses of
these economies, and much of this
OFDI goes back home via capital
round-tripping – this is something
the media has often failed to detect or chosen to ignore. In short,
the bear from Russia or the dragon
from China are really not so intimidating, and they have a tendency
to go back home(!).
Managers from emerging multinationals should learn how to
master the “rules of the game”
both at home and abroad. While
being “stuck at home” may be unpleasant, investing (and in many
cases operating) in host countries
may not be a “walk in the park”
either. Even in the case of managers whose ultimate aim is to invest back home after making the
arduous capital round-trip, one
potential benefit that they can leverage is that these endeavors can
indeed broaden their outlook and
globalize their mindset. Why not
take advantage of these opportunities to globalize their firm? As
the founders of Mittal Steel found
out, after they left India, the world
is their “oyster.” Once it was thoroughly globalized, Mittal Steel
ended up acquiring Arcelor and
forming ArcelorMittal (the largest
steel-maker in the world). This is
an achievement that would have

364

©

never materialized had Mittal Steel only focused on engaging in
capital round-tripping to go back
to India.
“Act local, think global” is something we always teach students
in our international business classes. While this slogan was coined
to refer to the location-by-location
competition of traditional MNEs,
we can stretch it to describe the
OFDI of emerging multinationals. Essentially, “acting local”,
has meant that a lot of them have
struggled to deal with institutional
difficulties in their home country. While “thinking global”, they
have endeavored to use capital
round-tripping to overcome these
national problems. However, as
the example of Mittal Steel makes
clear, once these emerging multinationals “think global”, they do
not have to “act local” (while only
focusing on their home country).
In other words, once they start to
“think global,” they can also “act
global” by globalizing their managerial mindset and turning their
firms into true global competitors
instead.

REFERENCES
BRASIL ECONOMICO. M. Peng: Prós
e contras do investimento Chinês no
Brasil. p. 8-9, June 30, 2010.
FUNG, H.-G; YAU, J; ZHANG, G. Reported trade figure discrepancy, regulatory arbitrage, and round-tripping:
Evidence from the China-Hong Kong
trade data. Journal of International
Business Studies, v. 42, n. 1, p. 152176, 2011.
KUZNETSOV, A. Outward FDI from
Russia and its policy context, update
2011. Columbia FDI Profiles, August
2, 2011.
PENG, M. W, SUN, S. L, PINKHAM, B;
CHEN, H. The institution-based view
as a third leg for a strategy tripod.
Academy of Management Perspectives,
v. 23, n. 3, p. 63-81, 2009.
PENG, M. W, WANG, D; JIANG, Y. An
institution-based view of international
business strategy: A focus on emerging economies. Journal of International Business Studies, v. 39, n. 5, p.
920-936, 2008.
UNCTAD. World Investment Report
2011. New York and Geneva: UNCTAD, 2011.

Acknowledgement

The ideas for this paper were first
presented at the Strategic Management Society Special Conference on
Latin America, March 2011, in Rio
de Janeiro, Brazil. This research
was supported by the Jindal Chair
and the Provost’s Distinguished
Professorship at UT Dallas. We
would also like to thank Flavio
Vasconcelos, Dean of Escola Brasileira de Administração Pública e
Empresas, Fundação Getulio Vargas
(FGV-EBAPE), for his support for this
research while one of the authors
was visiting FGV-EBAPE.

R AE n S ão Paulo n v. 52 n n. 3 n maio/jun. 2012 n 3 6 0 - 3 6 4

I SSN 0 0 3 4 -7 5 9 0

